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Abstract—We study security in partial repair in wireless
caching networks where parts of the stored packets in the caching
nodes are susceptible to be erased. Let us denote a caching
node that has lost parts of its stored packets as a sick caching
node and a caching node that has not lost any packet as a
healthy caching node. In partial repair, a set of caching nodes
(among sick and healthy caching nodes) broadcast information
to other sick caching nodes to recover the erased packets. The
broadcast information from a caching node is assumed to be
received without any error by all other caching nodes. All the
sick caching nodes then are able to recover their erased packets,
while using the broadcast information and the non-erased packets
in their storage as side information. In this setting, if an
eavesdropper overhears the broadcast channels, it might obtain
some information about the stored file. We thus study secure
partial repair in the senses of information-theoretically strong
and weak security. In both senses, we investigate the secrecy
caching capacity, namely, the maximum amount of information
which can be stored in the caching network such that there is no
leakage of information during a partial repair process. We then
deduce the strong and weak secrecy caching capacities, and also
derive the sufficient finite field sizes for achieving the capacities.
Finally, we propose optimal secure codes for exact partial repair,
in which the recovered packets are exactly the same as erased
packets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Caching, namely, bringing popular files closer to (potential)
user nodes (or clients) has been widely used in computer sys-
tems, computer networks and the Internet [1]–[3]. While these
networks have been mostly based on wired communications,
caching has benefited in efficient use of network resources,
e.g., energy and bandwidth, in controlling congestion, and in
reducing latency (the delay of accessing the users’s requested
data). Recently, the availability of large storage space in mo-
bile user nodes and in intermediate (relay) nodes has attracted
interest in using caching in wireless and cellular networks
while exploiting device-to-device (D2D) communications [4]–
[8]. In one scenario which is depicted in Fig. 1, a base
station in off-peak hours distributes coded packets of popular
files to mobile storage nodes. We refer to such nodes as
caching nodes. Since the popular files are generally big-size
files [9], each of the caching nodes may store parts of the
files. In these systems, in peak hours, a part of the users’ file
requests can be offered by mobile caching nodes through D2D
communications. Consequently, caching in wireless networks
benefits the networks in the efficient use of resources and
in less delay in accessing a file by the user nodes. Such
systems, to always work properly, i.e., to always have a copy of
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Fig. 1. An example of wireless caching network. A part of the users’ requests
are delivered by mobile caching nodes through D2D communications.
stored files available in the caching nodes, need a mechanism
to protect the stored information in caching nodes against
information loss.
Coding the stored data in caching nodes makes these
networks more robust against losing information, especially
when packets in storage nodes are vulnerable to failure. A
failure can affect all the packets in a caching node or a part
of stored packets, which are respectively referred to as node
failure or partial node failure. In wireless caching networks,
parts of the stored packets can be erased due to hardware
problems or software malicious attacks. In addition, a node
failure may happen due to caching node mobility. That is, a
caching node may move and become out of the base station’s
and other nodes’ coverage. As a consequence, the system may
lose access to some stored packets. Losing the stored packets
can be modeled as packet erasures, in which the maximum
distance separable (MDS) codes provide the highest reliability
against packet erasures [10]. A file coded by an (n, k)-MDS
code is divided into k equal-sized fragments1 which are then
coded to n fragments such that any set of k fragments can
rebuild the whole stored file.
In a wireless caching network, when a node fails, in a
process referred to as repair, a new node is generated by
the help of other caching nodes. The repair process has been
extensively studied recently and the optimal codes in the sense
of the required number of bits are proposed in [11]–[15]. In
the literature, it is mostly assumed that all the packets in a
1Here, a fragment is a set containing some equal-sized packets of informa-
tion.
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Fig. 2. An example for partial repair. Four caching nodes store a file containing four packets {a1, a2, b1, b2} by a (4, 2)−MDS code with coding coefficients
from finite field GF(3). Node 3 and 4 each loses one of their packets. For partial repair, nodes 1 and 2 broadcast packets a1 + b1 and 2(a1 + b1)+a2 + b2,
respectively. Nodes 3 and 4 by the broadcast data and the available side information can recover their erased packets. Thus, two packets are needed to be
transmitted for exact partial repair.
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Fig. 3. An example for secure partial repair in presence of an eavesdropper. Eve in this figure represents an eavesdropper. To have strong security, the
caching nodes stores two information packets a1, a2 from a file, along with two random packets z1, z2. These four packets are coded by a (4, 2)−MDS code
with coding coefficients from finite field GF(3). Node 3 and 4 each loses one of their packets. For secure partial repair, nodes 1 and 2 broadcast packets
a1 + z1 and 2(a1 + z1) + a2 + z2, respectively. Nodes 3 and 4 by the broadcast data and the available side information can recover their erased packets,
while Eve cannot obtain any information about the source. Thus, two packets are needed to be transmitted for exact partial repair and Eve cannot decode any
information about the source file.
caching node are lost and then the new node is generated.
In wireless caching networks, parts of the stored packets can
be erased due to hardware problems or software malicious
attacks. In a recent work [16], the repair has been studied
when some packets in each caching node are lost. We denote
the repair process when parts of caching nodes are erased as
the partial repair. In the partial repair problem, (possibly all)
the caching nodes broadcast packets of information to all other
nodes. The minimum required number of packet transmissions
for partial repair has been studied in [16]. Partial repair can be
functional or exact. In functional partial repair the regenerated
packet might not be exactly the same as the erased packet but
the system retains an (n, k)−MDS code, while in exact partial
repair the regenerated packet is exactly the same as the erased
packet. Exact repair has the benefits that it does not require
communications of the updated codes and it is also easier
for data collectors to download the file when there are some
systematic nodes (and remain systematic by exact repair).
The broadcast information by caching nodes during partial
repair might be overheard by an eavesdropper. In many appli-
cations, it is important to avoid any leakage of information to
an unintended user. In this paper, we focus on secure partial
repair in which the eavesdropper obtains no information by
overhearing repairing packets.
There are mainly two kinds of security definitions in the
network coding literature: strong security and weak security.
In the case of strong security, it is required that the mutual
information between the source and what an eavesdropper
overhears is zero. In practice, however, this level of security is
too strict [17]. Consider for example a source that contains two
binary symbols a and b. Then an eavesdropper who overhears
the symbol a + b, obtains (information-theoretically) one bit
of information. However, the eavesdropper can not obtain any
meaningful information about source symbols a and b, where
a and b are independent symbols. That is, the eavesdropper
cannot interpret (decode) any information about symbols a and
b by knowing a + b. This weakened level of security, which
does not imply strongly secure, yet is useful in practice, is
denoted as weak security. We study security in partial repair
in both senses.
First, we give an example to clarify the security matters in
partial repair and then show secure codes for this example.
Consider a wireless caching network, as shown in Fig. 2.
Packets a1, a2, b1, b2 are coded by a (4, 2)−MDS code in the
system. The packets have fixed size and contain elements from
a finite field, GF (q) (here q = 3). Suppose that nodes 3 and 4
individually lose one of their stored packets. In repair, node 1
broadcasts a coded packet (a1 + b1) and node 2 broadcasts a
coded packet 2(a1+ b1)+a2+ b2, using two interference-free
and error-free broadcast channels. Nodes 3 and 4 can recover
their erased packets by receiving the broadcast information and
using their stored packets as side information. For instance,
node 4 recovers its erased packets by removing (a1 + b1)
fragment from 2(a1 + b1) + a2 + b2, which yields a2 + b2.
Since node 4 has side information a2 in its storage, the node
can recover b2 by a simple operation a2+b2−a2 = b2. Similar
mechanism holds for recovering the lost packet in node 3.
Now, assume that there is an eavesdropper who overhears the
broadcast channels. Without a secure code, the eavesdropper
obtains two packets of information (this shall be more clear in
the next section) from information-theoretic point of view. To
provide a secure partial repair, we modify the stored packets in
the following way: consider packets (a1, a2) as source packets
and construct packets z1, z2 by taking values from the finite
field GF (q) at uniformly random and independent from the
source packets (a1, a2). Then encode packets (a1, a2, z1, z2)
with the same (4, 2)-MDS code, as illustrated in Fig. 3. We can
verify that the eavesdropper cannot decode any information
about the source packets by accessing the broadcast channels.
By this change, two packets of source information (here,
a1, a2) are stored in the cache network. We may say in this
example the strong secrecy caching capacity is 2.
Now, let us return to Fig. 2. In this example, if an eaves-
dropper overhears the broadcast channels, it cannot obtain
any meaningful information, because it cannot decode any
information about packets a1, a2, b1, b2 from the broadcast
information. We say the system is weakly secure and the weak
secrecy caching capacity is 4. A natural question is how to
derive the secrecy caching capacity in a general setting and
how to construct optimally secure partial repair codes in both
senses of weak and strong network coding security. This is
what we discuss in the rest of the paper.
A. Our Contributions
We study security in partial repair, and to the best of our
knowledge we are the first to do so. We find the secrecy
caching capacities in both senses of information-theoretically
strong and weak security notions. Meanwhile, the required
finite field size for the secure code is derived. Since, exact
repair is more interesting in practice, we propose partial exact
repair codes which are optimal (achieving the secrecy caching
capacity) for some scenarios.
B. Related Works
There are a wealth of works in information-theoretic secu-
rity over the last decades. The secrecy capacity in noiseless
wiretap channel (known as wiretap channel II) has been
studied by Ozarow and Wyner in [18]. Cai and Yeung studied
the security in wiretap networks [19]. They studied the security
in multicast networks where intermediate nodes can encode
their received messages and an eavesdropper has access to
a set of links in the networks. This coding is denoted as
secure network coding in multicast networks. The secure
capacity of multicast networks has been derived and the
required finite field size for achieving the capacity has been
obtained in [19]. Later, El Rouayheb and Soljanin studied the
secure network codes in wiretap networks by extending the
Ozarow and Wyner coding scheme to wiretap networks. They
then proposed secure network codes which require smaller
finite filed sizes than the proposed codes in [19]. Security by
exploiting network topology has been studied in [20]. The
interesting point in the proposed algorithm in [20] is that
the algorithm works even for cyclic networks. Feldman et. al.
in [21] showed that the finite field size for secure network
code can be made considerably smaller if the information rate
of the secure code is allowed to be a little smaller than the
secure capacity. The notion of meaningful information leaked
to an eavesdropper and weakly secure network codes have
been information-theoretically studied in [17] and then code
constructions have been proposed. Silva and Kschischang used
rank-metric codes and proposed universal strong and weak
secure network codes in [22] and [23].
More related works to our study are in [24]–[27] where
security in the repair problem of distributed storage systems
has been studied. In [24] the repair problem in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper (who can only intercept the data
in a network) and in presence of an active eavesdropper
(who can change the data in a network) has been studied
and the strong secure codes have been suggested. In [27],
the secure regenerating codes using product matrix codes are
suggested. Weak secure regenerating codes have been recently
studied in [26]. The previous studies of the repair problem in
distributed storage systems assume a node or several nodes
fail and all their stored packets are lost [11]–[15]. Same
assumption is also followed in the previous studies of the
security in the repair problem [24]–[27]. In a recent work,
the authors in [16] studied (partial) repair when parts of the
packets in storage node are lost.
C. Organization
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section II we
define the secrecy caching capacity in our setting and then we
formulate the problem. Next, we analyse the secrecy caching
capacity in Section III and discuss about codes that achieve
the secrecy caching capacity. We present secure codes for
exact partial repair achieving the secrecy caching capacity in
Section IV. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
To study strong and weak security in partial repair, we
first describe the setting of the partial repair problem in
wireless caching network and then we formulate the secrecy
caching capacities in the senses of strong and weak security.
Meanwhile, we define information-theoretically strong and
weak security conditions.
Consider an (n, k)-MDS-coded wireless caching network
where n caching nodes in the network store a file of size
M = kt packets such that every k caching nodes can rebuild
the stored file. Here, a packet is one unit of information. All
packets have equal size and contain elements from the finite
field GF (q). We assume each caching node stores t coded
packets, where t is a design parameter. When some packets in
the caching nodes (possibly in all caching nodes) are erased,
the erased packets are recovered in a partial repair process.
Clearly, to recover all the erased packets in the system, the
total number of available packets must be greater than or equal
to the size of the source file kt. Otherwise the repair is not
possible (some information packets are lost permanently if
they cannot be obtained again from the source). In the rest of
the paper, we always assume this condition holds.
Suppose, some packets in caching nodes are erased; that is,
node i (for i ∈ [n]2.) has lost t− |Pi| of its stored packets or
in other words, it has access to |Pi| ≤ t packets. In the partial
repair, caching node i (for i ∈ [n]) transmits ri packets, where
each transmitted packet is a linear combinations of available
packets in the node’s storage. Thus, in total Γ =
∑n
i=1 ri
packets are transmitted for recovery of the erased packets. Let
random variables Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ denote the Γ packets in partial
repair. In partial repair, we assume each caching node uses
a broadcast channel to transmit its repairing packets to all
other caching nodes. The broadcast channels are assumed to be
error-free. We also assume there is no interference between the
channels, for example, due to the use of orthogonal channels.
Now assume that there is an eavesdropper who overhears
the broadcast channels. We aim to design partial repair codes
such that there would be no leakage of information to the
eavesdropper in senses of strong and weak security conditions.
These are formally defined, as follows.
Definition 1 (Strong Security): Consider a wireless caching
network in which a source file is distributed among caching
nodes. Let the source file be denoted by a set S which
contains |S| packets, i.e., S = {s1, s2, . . . , s|S|}. Assume an
eavesdropper has access to a set of packets E = {e1, . . . , e|E|}.
The code is strongly secure, if
H(S|E) = H(S) (1)
Here, H(X) denotes the base-q entropy of the random variable
X . For a set X = {X1, X2, . . . , Xi}, we define H(X ) =
H(X1, X2, . . . , Xi).
Definition 2 (Weak Security): Consider the same wireless
caching network where a source file contains |S| packets, i.e.,
S = {s1, s2, . . . , s|S|}, and an eavesdropper has access to a
set of packets E = {e1, . . . , e|E|}. The code is weakly secure,
if
H(si|E) = H(si) for i = 1, . . . , |S|. (2)
Unlike the strong security condition, the eavesdropper in the
weak security condition obtains some information, but it can-
not deduce any meaningful information about the individuals
packets (here si for i ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}) of the source.
A fundamental question is that how much is the maximum
amount of information that we can store in the caching net-
work such that an eavesdropper obtains no information about
the source in partial repair. More formally, let S represent the
source file. As we use an (n, k)-MDS code for storing the
source file in the caching nodes, a set of k nodes, which is
denoted by a set D, contains M independent packets. That
is H(D) = M . Information-theoretically, an eavesdropper
overhearing packets Y1, . . . , YΓ obtains no information about
the source if
H(S|Y1, . . . , YΓ) = H(S). (3)
2 [n] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , n}
Since every k nodes can reconstruct the source file, we have
H(S|D) = 0, for ∀D ⊂ [n], |D| = k. (4)
We may refer to this as the perfect reconstruction condition.
We formally define the strong secrecy caching capacity (which
is here denoted as Css) as
Css , max H(S),
subject to: H(S|Y1, . . . , YΓ) = H(S),
H(S|D) = 0, for ∀D ⊂ [n], |D| = k. (5)
Following the same setting when an eavesdropper overhears
packets Y1, . . . , YΓ, we formally define the weakly secrecy
caching capacity (which is denoted here as Cws) as
Cws , max H(S),
subject to: H(si|Y1, . . . , YΓ) = H(si), (6)
for i = 1, . . . , |S|,
H(S|D) = 0, for ∀D ⊂ [n], |D| = k. (7)
The minimum required number of packet transmissions for
non-secure partial repair has been derived in [16], which we
here restate the results, as follows.
Theorem 1 (restated from [16]): Consider an (n, k)-MDS-
coded wireless caching network storing a file of size M
packets. Assume each caching node can store t packets. We
also assume caching node i has lost t − |Pi|(0 ≤ |Pi| ≤ t)
packets, and thus, it still contains |Pi| packets, for i ∈ [n].
For partial repair, caching node i broadcasts ri packets to all
other nodes. The necessary and sufficient condition for partial
repair is that for any set D = {ni1 , ni2 , . . . , nik} of k distinct
caching nodes we have∑
i∈[n]\D
ri ≥ kt−
∑
ij |nij∈D
|Pij |. (8)
Proof (sketch): We model the problem as an information
flow problem in a multicast network and then we use the
results of network coding in multicast networks. For more
details, please refer to [16].
The following corollary is deduced as a result of Theorem 1,
by summing both sides of inequalities in (8) and removing
unnecessary constraints over
(
n
k
)
sets of selection, ∀D ⊂ [n]s.
Corollary 1: Consider a file encoded by an (n, k)−MDS
code in a wireless caching system in which each node stores
t packets. Assume there are nh(0 ≤ nh ≤ n) nodes having
no erased packets (healthy nodes). Then Γmin is computed by
Γmin =


min
{
kt,
(
n
k
)
kt(
n−1
k
)
−
(
nh−1
k
)−[(
n−1
k−1
)
−
(
nh−1
k−1
)]∑n
i=1 |Pi|(
n−1
k
)
−
(
nh−1
k
)
}
if nh > k,
min
{
kt,
nkt
n− k
−
k
n− k
∑n
i=1 |Pi|
}
otherwise.
(9)
We shall derive the strong and weak secrecy caching capacities
in the next section.
III. SECURE CACHING CAPACITY
In this section, we derive the secrecy caching capacities for
the strong and weak security conditions.
A. Strong Secrecy Capacity
We first derive an upper bound on the strong secrecy caching
capacity and then show that this bound is tight by proving the
existence of codes that achieve the upper bound.
1) Upper Bound: For a given Γmin, the minimum number
of packet transmissions in partial repair, we can derive an
upper bound of strong secrecy caching capacity, as follows.
Lemma 1: Suppose an (n, k)-MDS-coded wireless caching
network has the capacity of storing M packets. Suppose
caching node i, for i ∈ [n], has lost t − |Pi| (0 ≤ |Pi| ≤ t)
packets and Γ =
∑n
i=1 ri packets are transmitted by caching
nodes in the partial repair process. Let Γmin denote the
minimum required number of packet transmissions, derived
from Corollary 1. Then the secure cache capacity is upper
bounded by
Css ≤M − Γmin. (10)
Proof:
H(S) = H(S|Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ)−H(S|D), (11)
= I(S;D)− I(S;Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ), (12)
= H(D)−H(Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ)
−H(D|S) +H(Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ|S), (13)
≤ M − Γmin. (14)
In the proof, (11) holds because of the strong security
condition H(S|Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ) = H(S), and the fact that
every set of k nodes can reconstruct the stored file, i. e.,
H(S|D) = 0. We obtain (12) by adding and subtracting
a term H(S). We also know that for successful repair, we
must have H(Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ) ≥ Γ ≥ Γmin. In (13), we have
H(Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ|S)−H(D|S) ≤ 0 since
H(D, Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ|S) (15)
= H(D|S) +H(Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ|D, S), (16)
= H(Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ|S) +H(D|Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ, S). (17)
Since (Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ) is a function of D and
S then H(Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ|D, S) = 0, and since
H(D|Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ, S) ≥ 0, then H(Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ|S) −
H(D|S) ≤ 0. This finalizes the proof.
The following corollary is an immediate result from
Lemma 1.
Corollary 2: A partial repair code achieves the upper bound
of the strong security caching capacity if
H(Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ|S) = Γ. (18)
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2) Achievable Bound: To secure a caching network, we
precode the source symbols before entering MDS encoder.
This process is illustrated in Fig. 4. When we use matrix T
as a security precoding matrix, we can prove the existence of
precoding matrix T . This is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Consider a wireless caching network where each
caching node stores M/k packets based on an (n, k)−MDS
code over GF (q); that is, every set of k caching nodes has
access to M packets. We use a precoding matrix T for security.
Assume some packets of the caching nodes are erased and
Γ packets are broadcast for the partial repair. There exists
a precoding matrix T that makes the partial repair strongly
secure with Css = M − Γ if
q >
(
M
Γ
)
. (19)
Proof (sketch): From the results in [16], we can model
the partial repair in a wireless caching network into a multicast
network. In this multicast network, a source transmits M
packets to the destinations. There is an eavesdropper who
overhears Γ independent packets out of M total stored packets.
We design the matrix T such that the eavesdropper cannot
decode any information. By the results in secure network
coding in multicast networks (Theorem 2 in [17], and also
results in [19]), there exists T , if (19) holds.
Using Lemmata 1 and 2, we can deduce the strong secrecy
capacity of wireless caching networks.
Theorem 2: The strong secrecy capacity of the wireless
caching network is
Css =
{
M − Γmin if Γmin < M,
0 otherwise.
(20)
B. Weak Secrecy Capacity
For the weak security condition, the following lemma states
an upper bound of the weak secure caching capacity.
1) Upper Bound:
Lemma 3: Suppose an (n, k)-MDS-coded wireless caching
network has capacity of storing M packets. Suppose caching
node i, for i ∈ [n], has lost t−|Pi| (0 ≤ |Pi| ≤ t) packets and
Γ =
∑n
i=1 ri packets is transmitted by caching nodes in the
partial repair process. Then the weak secure caching capacity
is upper bounded by
Cws ≤M. (21)
Proof: As the system is storing a file of size M by an
MDS code, then this would be a trivial upper bound.
2) Achievable Bound: To weakly secure a caching network,
we precode the source symbols before entering MDS encoder,
as illustrated in Fig. 4. When we use matrix T as a security
precoding matrix, then we can prove the existence of precod-
ing matrix T . This is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: Consider a wireless caching network where each
caching node stores M/k packets based on an (n, k)−MDS
code over GF (q); that is, every set of k caching nodes has
access to M packets. Suppose, we use a precoding matrix T
for security. Suppose, some packets of the caching nodes are
erased and Γ packets are broadcast for the partial repair. For
Γ < M , there exists a precoding matrix T that makes the
partial repair weakly secure with Cws = M if
qM >
(
M
Γ
)
qΓ + qM−1 (22)
Proof (sketch): From [16], we can model the partial repair
in a wireless caching network into a multicast network. In
this multicast network, a source is transmitting M packets
to the destinations. There is an eavesdropper who overhears Γ
independent packets out of M total stored packets for Γ < M .
We design matrix T such that the eavesdropper cannot decode
any information. By the results in secure network coding in
multicast networks (Theorem 1 in [17]), there exists T , if (19)
holds.
Using Lemmata 3 and 4, we can deduce the weak secrecy
capacity of wireless caching networks.
Theorem 3: The weak secrecy capacity of the wireless
caching network is
Cws =
{
M if Γ < M,
0 otherwise.
(23)
Theorems 2 and 3 prove the existence of optimal secure
codes. Yet, for the existence, the codes must be over a
sufficiently large finite field (consider that M is generally
large). This makes the encoding/decoding processes compli-
cated. In addition, in practice codes which provide exact repair
are preferred. That is, because exact repair does not require
communications of the updated codes (of the new packets)
and it is also easier for data collectors to download the file
when there are some systematic nodes (and remain systematic
by exact repair). These two main reasons have motivated us
to study the secure codes in partial exact repair. In the next
section, we propose an explicit code construction for exact
partial repair. The proposed codes have lower complexity than
the above codes, as they require comparatively small field size.
IV. SECURE CACHING CODES FOR EXACT REPAIR
In this section, we propose secure codes for exact partial
repair. In exact partial repair, the regenerated packets are ex-
actly the same as erased packets. Exact partial repair generally
requires more repairing packets to be transmitted [16]. Here,
for a specific case, we present an explicit secure code for exact
repair that does not require more transmission than functional
partial repair.
Consider a wireless caching system using an (n, k)−MDS
code, where n = 2k. Assume each caching node stores t = k
packets. Assume that caching nodes have equally lost one of
their stored packets. That is |Pi| = k − 1, for i ∈ [n]. By
Theorem 1, the minimum Γ equals to n. Thus, the minimal
partial repair is obtained when each caching node transmits
one coded packets. By Theorem 2, the strong secure capacity
is M − Γmin = (k − 2)k. Next we show how the minimal
partial repair guaranteeing strong security can be achieved.
A. Caching System Construction
Let us denote the source file by a k × (k − 2) matrix S,
where each element represents a distinct packet of the source
file, namely,
S =


s11 s12 . . . s1(k−2)
s21 s12 . . . s2(k−2)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
sk1 sk2 . . . sk(k−2)

 . (24)
Now, we use random variables z1, z2, . . . , z2k to construct a
virtual source matrix S′ as follows. Note that random variables
z1, z2, . . . , z2k are selected randomly and uniformly from the
finite field GF (q),
S
′ =

z11 z12 s11 + z11 + z12 . . . s1(k−2) + z11 + z12
z21 z22 s21 + z21 + z22 . . . s2(k−2) + z21 + z22
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
zk1 zk2 sk1 + zk1 + zk2 . . . sk(k−2) + zk1 + zk2

 .
(25)
Let us consider k systematic nodes, where the i-th system-
atic node stores k packets denoted by the i-th row of matrix
S
′
. In addition, there are k parity nodes each of which stores
k coded packets. To get the coded packets in parity nodes, we
construct the encoding matrix P as
P = ΦS′, (26)
where Φ is a k × k-dimensional Vandermonde matrix, with
elements from a finite field GF (q), for q > k. Let¡ the i-th
row of matrix P represent the k packets stored in the i-th
parity node. If ϕij denotes an element in row i and column j
of matrix Φ, then we can show the elements in a parity node
i as
(P)ij =
k∑
m=1
ϕims
′
mj . (27)
Proposition 1: The code from encoding vector in (27) is an
(n, k)-MDS code.
Proof: It is straightforward to verify that, by selecting
any k storage nodes the encoding vectors are independent and
thus the original file can be reconstructed by, e.g., Gaussian
elimination method.
B. Secure Partial Repair for Systematic Nodes
Assume a packet siu in a systematic node i, and a packet
piv in a parity node i, for i ∈ [k], and u 6= v are erased. We
can describe the secure repairing process as follows. For the
secure partial repair, a parity node i transmits a packet
(P)iu =
k∑
m=1
ϕims
′
mu = ϕis
′
u, (28)
where s′u denotes the u-th column in matrix S′. Thus, we
have
[P1u . . .Pku]
T
= Φs′u. (29)
Since Φ is a non-singular matrix, all the systematic nodes can
recover their erased packets by solving linear equations, e.g.,
by Gaussian elimination. Note that the eavesdropper cannot
obtain any information from the broadcast information ϕis′u
for i ∈ [k].
C. Secure Partial Repair for Parity Nodes
Similarly, we can recover the erased packets in the parity
nodes. We can follow the approach of changing variables
proposed in [28]. By changing variables, we can define the
packets in parity nodes as new systematic packets. That is,
Snew = P = ΦS
′. (30)
Then,
Pnew = S
′ = Φ−1Snew. (31)
For exact secure partial repair, systematic node i transmits
(S)′iv = (Pnew)iv . Since Φ−1 is a non-singular matrix,
the erased packets can be recovered similarly to repair in
systematic nodes. Again, the eavesdropper cannot obtain any
information from the broadcast information (S′)iv for i ∈ [k].
Thus, the system is strongly secure, and q > k is the required
finite field size for code construction.
Theorem 4: The proposed codes in this section achieves the
strong secrecy capacity.
Proof: The proposed codes satisfy the following condition
H(Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ|S) = Γ, (32)
where Y1, Y2, . . . , YΓ are (S′)iv, (P)iu for i ∈ [k]. We then use
Corollary 2 to prove that these codes are optimally secure.
We showed that optimal security for exact partial repair in
wireless caching networks can be achieved by low complexity
codes and through simple operations which is known as repair-
by-transfer [29]. We shall study low complexity codes for
optimally secure and exact partial repair in a general setting
as future work.
V. CONCLUSION
We studied security in partial repair when an eavesdropper
has access to the broadcast information. We investigated
information-theoretically strong and weak secure caching ca-
pacities. We first derived upper bounds and then showed
that there exist secure codes when the codes are over a
sufficiently large finite field size. We then proposed codes
that have low complexity and the required finite field size is
comparatively small. These codes are interesting in practical
wireless caching networks, as the code construction is explicit
and the partial repair is exact repair. Our proposed codes work
well in homogenous networks (all nodes lose equal number
of packets). As the future work, we aim to design secure
codes in partial repair for more general networks, including
heterogenous networks.
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